Extract
Bakery and Confectionery Workers, Etc., 1542 (1962)
Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union of America, Local 12, AFL-CIO1 and Marie Ruston. Case No.
6-CB-284. June 14 , 1956 DECISION AND ORDEROn November 8, 1955, Trial Examiner Earl S. Bellman issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief.The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications and additions :1. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) by insisting, as a condition of employment under its union-security contract with the Company, that the Company's employees tender dues in amounts which in effect included assessments or fines for delinquency in payment of such dues. As more fully set forth in the Intermediate Report, the record discloses that until the middle of January 1955 the Respondent had required the payment of a $1 assessment for failure to pay its monthly dues on time, and had made such payment a condition of retaining employment under the union-security provisions of its contract. On November 18, 1954, the Board issued a decision and order 2 finding that this practice violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Thereafter the Respondent amended its bylaws by increasing its dues in the amount of $1, at the same time allowing a 'discount' in precisely this amount for payment of the dues during the month for which they are due.' It is clear that the Respondent's revised dues practice had precisely the same effect, insofar as the amounts involved were concerned, as the earlier practice which the Board found to be violative of the Act, i The AFL and CIO having merged subsequent to the hearing in this proceeding, we are amending the identification of the affiliation of the Respondent accordingly.2 The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ( Pittsburgh Bakery ), 110 NLRB 918.e We note, inter alia, that the Respondent retained in its bylaws the description of dues as delinquent which are not paid on or before the last day of the current month.Thus, on their face, the amended bylaws increased only the amount chargeable for 'delinquent' dues.115 NLRB No. 235.BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY WORKERS, ETC . 1543 i. e., an increase of $1 in the amount payable was made dependent on whether dues were paid before or after the end of the current month.Although termed a 'discount,' this difference in amount is unlike the relatively small discounts for early payments which prevail in the business world, for here the additional sum amounts to 331/3 percent, a sum which does not appear to bear any probable relationship to additional billing or bookkeeping costs which might have to be borne by the Respondent. Nor did the Respondent show that by increasing its dues it was seeking any additional revenue. In view of all the circumstances, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent's revised dues practice continued in effect the former practice of imposing an assessment or fuse for failure to pay dues which had become delinquent, and that the Respondent thereby restrained and coerced employees in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.We further find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (2) and Section 8 (b) (1) (A) by causing Ruston's discharge by the Company under this unlawful arrangement.2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's recommendation that the Respondent, in order to terminate its liability for further back pay to Ruston, should be required again to notify the Company that it has no objection to Ruston's reinstatement, together with an affirmative request to the Company to reinstate her. As set forth by the Trial Examiner, the record shows that the Respondent, approximately 3 months after Ruston's discharge, wrote a letter to both the Company and Ruston, notifying them that it had no objection to her employment by the Company. The Trial Examiner reasoned that this letter did not constitute an effective remedy of the unfair labor practice involved in Ruston's discharge, because the Company had adopted a policy of refusing to reinstate employees discharged under the union-security contract despite its receipt thereafter of letters from the Union consenting to their reemployment. We note, however, that the Respondent's letter was in its form ...See the full content of this document
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