California Saw & Knife Works, 224 (1995)

National Labor Relations Board

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California Saw & Knife Works, 224 (1995)

California Saw and Knife Works and Peter A.


International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO; and its District Lodges Nos. 50, 66, 115, 120, 508, 720, and 751; and its Local Lodges Nos. 78, 354, 821, 946, 1125, 1327, 1871, 1916, 2024, 2227 and 2230 (Various Employers) and Various Individuals. Cases 34-CA-5160, 34-CB-1313, 34-CB- 1314, 34-CB-1315, 34-CB-1316, 34-CB-1323, 34-CB-1324, 34-CB-1360, 34-CB-1361, 34- CB-1362, 34-CB-1363, 34-CB-1408, 34-CB- 1409, 34-CB-1421, 34-CB-1422, 34-CB- 1440(4-30), 34-CB-1440(32-48), 34-CB- 1440(50-61), 34-CB-1440(63-64), 34-CB- 1440(67-68), 34-CB-1440(86), 34-CB-1450, 34- CB-1451, 34-CB-1452, 34-CB-1453, 34-CB- 1454, 34-CB-1455, and 34-CB-1510

December 20, 1995




On May 29, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Clifford H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The General Counsel, the Respondent Unions, and various Charging Parties filed exceptions and supporting briefs. The General Counsel, the Respondent Unions, the Respondent Employer, and various Charging Parties filed answering briefs.

The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings,1 findings,2 and conclusions as modified and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.


In Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), the Supreme Court held that Section 8(a)(3) of

the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or NLRA) does not permit a collective-bargaining representative, over the objection of dues-paying nonmember employees, to expend funds collected under a union-security agreement on activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment.3

The Court in Beck construed Section 8(a)(3) as providing that employees enjoying the benefits of union representation should bear their fair share of the cost incurred by the collective-bargaining agent in representing them.4 The Court held, however, that the expenditure of dues and fees on activities outside the union's role as collective-bargaining representative violated the union's duty of fair representation to nonmember employees who objected to such expenditures.5

The Beck decision has evoked immense legal and political controversy.6 This case represents the Board's first consideration of the ramifications of the Beck decision under the NLRA.7 We review today the voluntary Beck program set up by the International Asso-

1 The Respondent International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has excepted to the judge's findings that: (1) the General Counsel did not abuse his discretion by refusing to defer to the arbitration procedure set forth in its dues-objection policy; (2) the complaint allegations are not barred by Sec. 10(b) because they are sufficiently related to the underlying unfair labor practice charges; and (3) the complaint did not improperly create a class of unnamed employees. We note no argument has been made in support of these exceptions and, accordingly, they are deemed to have been waived. Sec. 102.46(b)(2) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. In any event, we agree with the judge, for the reasons set forth by him, that these procedural arguments are meritless.

2 Some parties have excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188

F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.

3 Sec. 8(a)(3) provides that:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later,

(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) [of the Act], in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made . . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and con...

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