Extract
Gulf Coast Oil Co., 1513 (1951)
restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned makes the following :CONCLUSIONS OF LAW1. United Furniture Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.2. By prohibiting on or about March 1, 1951, and at all times thereafter the distribution of union literature on the Respondent's property (luring the nonworking time of the employees, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.4. The Respondent, except as stated above, has not engaged in any acts or conduct in violation of Section 8 (a) (l.) of the Act.[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.] GULF COAST OIL COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN , AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL 270, AFL. Case No. 15-CA-297. February 5,1950Decision and Order On May 14, 1951, Trial Examiner Stephen S. Bean issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, recommending that the complaint herein be dismissed, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, all parties were advised that exceptions were due on or before June 6, 1951. The General Counsel sent a telegram to the Board before that date, on May 31, 1951, requesting a 5-day extension of time to file exceptions to June 11, 1951. However, the General Counsel did not serve written copies of this request upon any of the parties. On May 31, 1951, the same day that the General Counsel made his request, the Board in reply sent a telegram to all parties extending the time for filing to June 11, 1951.On June 1, 1951, at approximately 10 a. m., the General Counsel's representative called one of the Respondent's attorneys on the telephone and advised that he had applied for an extension of time in which to file exceptions. At approximately 10: 30 a. m. on the same day, the Respondent's attorney received the Board's telegram of May 31, 1951, granting the extension. On June 4, 1951, the General Counsel advised the Respondent's attorney that he was filing exceptions 97 NLRB No. 238.to the Intermediate Report. On June 5, 1951, the Respondent's attorney filed a motion that the extension previously granted to the General Counsel be recalled and that, unless exceptions to the Intermediate Report were filed by June 6, 1951, the original date on which they were due, such exceptions should be deemed waived for all.purposes and the Intermediate Report should be adopted by the Board_ On June 7, 1951, the General Counsel submitted his exceptions with a supporting brief and a response to the Respondent's motion. On June 25, 1951, the Respondent was given until July 9, 1951, to file a reply to the General Counsel's exceptions and brief and ruling was reserved on the Respondent's motion. The Respondent filed a reply brief on July 6,1951. ' While we agree with the Respondent's contention that the General Counsel failed to comply literally with the requirement in Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, that requests for extension of time in which to file exceptions shall be in writing and copies thereof shall be immediately served- on each of the other parties, we are convinced that the policies of the Act would best be effectuated by construing the General Counsel's timely telephonic notice as substantial compliance. In making this determination, we have taken into consideration the fact that the Rules and Regulations specifically provide that they shall be -liberally construed and the fact that a request for extension of time is in itself only a procedural step. Accordingly, the Respondent's motion is hereby denied.The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed.- The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, with the following additions and modifications :We agree with the Trial Examiner that the complaint in this case should be dismissed. However, we adopt his reasoning only to the extent indicated below. The pertinent facts, as more fully set forth in the Intermediate Report, are as follows.Instead of reporting for work on August 18, 1950, at the usual time of 7 a. in., all 11 of Respondent's truck drivers went to the union hall where benefits anticipated to be derived from union organization were discussed, initiation fees were turned over, cards delivered, applications for in...See the full content of this document
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