Hyster Co., 192 (1972)

Extract

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Hyster Co., 192 (1972)

Hyster Company and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-9160

July 14, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER

BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS

FANNING AND JENKINS

On February 25, 1972, Trial Examiner Josephine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt her recommended Order.1

Contrary to our dissenting colleague, and as noted more fully by the Trial Examiner, we find that the record discloses with respect to the issue of agency, that Maddox, chairman of the Town Council, was more than merely a prominent citizen who served as a reference for some of the Respondent's employees.

Maddox testified that he discussed job applicants 75 to 100 times with Paul, the Respondent's personnel manager, that he referred 25 to 35 employees to the Respondent and that he spoke to Respondent's employees about their jobs on 10 to 15 occasions.

Applicants Stanford and Carruth were advised to see Maddox by the Respondent's personnel manager,

Paul. Applicant Taylor was advised by the Respondent's employees to talk with Maddox, and the same advice was given to applicant Smith by 'people talking.' The Respondent made no effort to discourage the apparent impression of job applicants, its employees, and people in the community that Maddox was its apparent agent. Applicants Taylor;

Smith, Stanford, and Carruth were 'each hired after individual conversations with Maddox. During these conversations, Maddox interrogated the applicants concerning their union activity and sympathy, threatened the discharge of employees who signed union authorization cards, and threatened that the Respondent would move away if the employees chose to be represented by the Union. Maddox also made appearances at the plant and discussed with the employees the problems a union might create.

Based on the foregoing, we find, contrary to our dissenting colleague, that Maddox's conversations with Smith, Stanford, and Carruth warrant the Trial Examiner's 8(a)(1) findings and remedy.

Concerning Stanford's discharge, the facts of which are more fully set out by the Trial Examiner, the record shows that Maddox, as a result of his interrogation of Stanford, became aware in early August that Stanford had signed an authorization card and that Stanford thought that a Union 'would help things out.' Before this conversation, Stanford had received a merit increase and had been offered the opportunity to transfer to a job in which he could make more money. About 2 weeks after the conversation, a few days after the Respondent's personnel manager and Maddox returned from a 10-day vacation together, Stanford was discharged without any advance notice. Stanford's foreman was called back into the plant from the first day of his vacation to prepare Stanford's termination report and to advise Stanford of his discharge. Stanford's job continued to be performed after his discharge.

Concerning the Respondent's retention of union adherents who were more active than Stanford, we agree with the Trial Examiner that a violation of the Act does not have to be wholesale to be a violation.

The record shows that Stanford is the only employee whose union sympathies were shown to have been known to Respondent, and the only employee discharged. With respect to Stanford's alleged warnings as to his job performance, we note, as did the Trial Examiner, that Stanford was never told that his performance was so poor as to place him in jeopardy of discharge or disciplinary action. To the contrary, employees Carruth and Smith, whom Stanford supplied with parts, testified that Stanford adequately performed his work. The record shows that Stanford was unaware of two adverse information reports which were a part of his personnel file and further indicates that, in any event, the dates on which the reports were written are doubtful. In the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the Trial Examiner (1) that the Respondent had knowledge of Stanford's union sympathy and activity, and (2) that Stanford's discharge was discriminatorily motivated, so as to be violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adop...

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