Extract
Limestone Apparel Corp., 722 (1981)
Limestone Apparel Corp. and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 10CA-13840 and 10-CA-13951
April 7, 1981 DECISION AND ORDEROn July 21, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Thomas E. Bracken issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Charging Party filed an answering brief.The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.In this case we affirm and adopt the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions that Respondent's discharge of Katherine Anderson and Clinton Foster violated Section 8(a)(3), including his finding that the reasons advanced by the Respondent to support its actions were pretextual.After the Administrative Law Judge rendered his decision, we issued our decision in Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), recently cited with approval by the First Circuit in Statler Industries, Inc., No. 80-1455, March 12, 1981. That decision indicated that we would apply the analysis it set forth to all cases alleging violai Respondent asserts that the Administrative Law Judge's resolutions of credibility. findings of fact, and conclusions of law are the result of bias. After a careful examination of the entire record,:e are satisfied that this allegation is without merit. There is no basis for finding that bias and partiality existed merely because the Administrative Law Judge resolved important factual conflicts in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses..N.LR.B, v Pittsburgh Stearmship Compaty. 337 U.S. 656. 659 (1949) Furthermore. it is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resoluiols are incorrect. Stadard Dry Wall Products. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We find no basis for reversing his findings.We hereby correct two inadvertent errors by the Administrative Law Judge. Katherine Anderson was the employee who complained to Inez Payne that she did not have a supervisor Secondly. Respondent's direct knowledge of Anderson's and Clinton Foster's union activities was based oil Payne's and Charles Oliner's having seen their yellow authorization cards on July 19. 1978. not July 20. Wilh respect to that knowledge. we find that Payne and Oliner would have known on July 19 what the yellow cards in Anderson's and Clinton's possession were since they had been present a an employee meeting on July 18 henl'lant Manager James Ford held up and read from such a card.In agreeing with the Administralive L.aw Judge that Respondent iolated Sec. 8(a)(1)by telling its employees that something would be done about any employee caught signing uion cards. or passing them around.or talking about the Union 'onl our comnpany time.' we do not adopt his reliance on E.e.x lItiernutional. Ic.. 211 NLRB 749 (1974). Rather. we adopt only that portion of the Administrative Law Judge's analysis which finds that Respondet's use (lf the phrase 'company time' is anmbiguous because such a term is susceptible Itothe interpretationl that solicitation and unionllactivities would be prohibited during all paid fine including nlonsorking time such as breaks and lunch periods. See (Chicago .Uugnevium Cuioitig. Company. 240 NLRH 4(X) (1979): Ilorida SwisvlCorporuaion. 215 NLRB 97 (1974) 255 NLRB No. 101 tions of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) turning upon employer motivation. However, we find it unnecessary formally to set forth that analysis in those cases where an administrative law judge's findings and conclusions fully satisfy the analytical objectives of Wright Line. We find that such is the case here. Thus, where an administrative law judge has evaluated the employer's explanation for its action and concluded that the reasons advanced by the employer were pretextual, that determination constitutes a finding that the reasons advanced by the employer either did not exist or were not in fact relied upon. 2No substantive objective is served by our reiterating and recasting an administrative law judge's finding and conclusions in order to achieve formalistic consistency with Wright Line by inserting the term 'prima facie showing' after the evidence which demonstrates the employer's wrongful motive on the record as a wholes and then stating that 'the employer did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the employee's protected conduct' where the administrative law judge has concluded that the proffered explanation is pretextual. For a finding of pretext necessarily means that the reasons advanced by the employer either did not exist or were not in fact relied upon, thereby leaving intact the i...See the full content of this document
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