Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 162 (1979)

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. andTeamsters Local 676, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Petitioner. Case 4-RC-13159

January 24, 1979 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION

BY CHAIRMAN FANNIN(; AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO

Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a hearing was held before Hearing Officers William J.

Payne and David R. Keller. Subsequently, pursuant to Section 102.67 of the National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Series 8, as amended, the Regional Director for Region 4 transferred this case to the Board for decision. Thereafter, the Employer and the Petitioner filed briefs in support of their respective positions.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has reviewed the Hearing Officers' rulings made at the hearing and finds that they are free from prejudicial error.' They are hereby affirmed.

Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the Board finds:

1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.

2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain employees of the Employer.

3. The Employer, a Delaware corporation, is engaged primarily in the business of collecting, compiling, evaluating, and reporting financial information.

   Through its credit reporters stationed across the country, it obtains financial data on a voluntary basis from over 3 million businesses. The Employer's reports are then made available to subscribers, principally to assist them in making decisions regarding extensions of credit.

   Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of credit reporters. The Employer contends that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to extend representational rights to its credit reporters and, alternatively,

   After the hearing was closed on June 2. 1978. the Employer filed an appeal with the Board from certain rulings of the Regional Director and the Hearing Officers excluding certain proffered evidence, revoking a suhpoena duce. ecum served on the Petitioner, and closing the record. On Jul) 14.

   1978, the Board granted the appeal and on August 16 and 17. 1978. the hearing was reconvened and additional evidence was taken.

   240 NLRB No. 16 that Petitioner, and any other labor organization which represents employees other than credit reporters, should be disqualified from representing credit reporters. The Employer claims that its ability to obtain financial information from firms depends upon its ability to assure each reporting firm that the information will be disseminated only to subscribers who have legitimate interest in the firm's financial status.

   The subscriber's contract prohibits the dissemination of information contained in credit reports to third parties, and limits its use to 'credit, insurance, market, and other business decisions.' Although it occasionally compiles reports on labor organizations, the Employer does not permit labor organizations to subscribe to its service, inasmuch as it deems any use by a labor organization not to be a legitimate business use. Were its credit reporters accorded representational rights, the Employer argues, its ability to assure the confidentiality of the information it collects would he diminished severely, with a corresponding increase in the number of firms declining to provide su h information. This would occur because credit reporters who were union members would 'be faced with an irreconcilable conflict of interest and division of loyalties' regarding their access to confidential business information relating to numerous other en' ployers which could be of use to their own union as well as to other unions. Thus, firms would fear, even more than they do now,2 that information regarding their financial status or labor relations policies could fall into the hands of a labor organization.

   The Employer predicts that, if Petitioner were to win an election and be certified, reporting firms would cease to provide financial data.3

   According to the Employer, this would be detrimental to the Nation's credit markets, not to mention its business. Further, the Employer argues that, if its credit reporters are organized and if this confounds its efforts to restrict access to its reports, it may lose the qualified privilege it currently enjoys regarding possible tort liability for making false reports. Finally, the Employer contends that, if Petitioner wins an election and is certified, and if the fears that credit reporters will readily disseminate confidential information to Petitioner and other labor organizations are borne out, 'the delicate balance . . . between parties in collective bargaining,' specifically the rules under which labor organizations may obtain financial data from employers.4 will be compromised.

   The Employer introduced eviderce of several cases where reporting companies have refused to provide the Employer with any more financial data after unions had obtained copies of their Dun & Bradstreet reports.

   In support of this contention, Respondent introduced a stud) conducted by he Roper Organization. Inc.. which it claims establishes that if reporters opt for union representation most 'of the current subjects of the Dun & Bradstreet credit reporters would give lers financial information to the Company than the) presently provide.' DUNN & BRADSTREET 163

   In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 194 NLRB 9(1971), the Board rejected virtually all of the Employer's arguments and directed an election in a unit of credit reporters assigned to several of the Employer's offices located in New York and New Jersey. In so doing the Board reasoned: 'The law has clearly rejected the notion that membership in a labor organization is in itself incompatible with the obligations of fidelity owed to an employer by its employees.' Id. at 9. In response to the Employer's contention that unionized credit reporters would be more likely to divulge confidential information to labor organizations and therefore 'some sources [would] withhold information previously furnished,' the Board stated that:

   'Such conjecture, even if established as fact, does not afford an adequate reason for depriving employees of their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Act.' Id. at 10.5 Finally, the Board found no merit in the Employer's contention that, because over 90 percent of the other employers whose employees were represented by the petitioner therein were subjects of Dun & Bradstreet reports, the petitioner should have been disqualified from representing credit reporters.

   The Employer now contends that the Board should reconsider its earlier Dun & Bradstreet decisions. It states that in the earlier case the Board did not 'give sufficient weight to the realities of the labor-management relationship,' and that unlike the earlier cases there is evidence here (the Roper survey) that reporting companies will decline to provide data to the Employer if credit reporters are organized. Finally, the Employer maintains that, by virtue of...