Talon, Inc., Employer And International Association Of Machinists, Lodge No. 110, Petitioner, 1134 (1946)

In the Matter of TALON, INC., EMPLOYER and INTERNATIONAL AssoCIATION OF MACHINISTS, LODGE NO. 110, PETITIONER Case No. 6-R-1355.-Decided August 2, 19.6 Messrs. Fred R. Davis, A. J. Gilles, William F. McIntyre, and Johva J. Williams, of Meadeville, Pa., for the Employer.

Mr. A. G. Skundor, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for the Petitioner.

Mr. Joseph A. Padway, by Mr. Robert A. Wilson, of Washington,

D. C., and Mr. William Sturm, of Toledo, Ohio, for the SFU.

Mr. John A. Nevros, of counsel to the Board.

DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed, hearing in this case was held at Meadville,

Pennsylvania, on May 20, 1946, before Joseph Lepie, Trial Examiner.

The Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. At the hearing, the SFU moved to dismiss the petition on various grounds. The Trial Examiner reserved ruling on this motion for the Board. For reasons stated hereinafter, the motion is hereby denied.

Upon the entire record in the case, the National Labor Relations Board makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF TIIE EMPLOYER Talon, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, is engaged at its Meadville,

Pennsylvania, plant in the manufacture of slide fasteners. During 1945, the Employer purchased for its Meadville plant approximately $7,313,000 worth of raw materials and supplies, of which about 80 percent came from sources outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. During the same period, the Employer's Meadville plant manufactured products valued at approximately $22,370.000, of which 85 percent represented shipments to points outside the Commonwealth.

The Employer admits and we find that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.

1134 1135 II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The Petitioner is a labor organization claiming to represent employees of the Employer.

Slide Fasteners Union No. 20230, herein called the SFU, is a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, claiming to represent employees of the Employer.

3. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION The Employer refuses to recognize the Petitioner as the exclusive bargaining representative of the operate-set-up employees of the Employer until the Petitioner has been certified by the Board in an appropriate unit.

   At the hearing, the SFU moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds, among others, that: (1) a jurisdictional dispute exists between the Petitioner and the SFU; (2) the unions should be left to adjust the matter between themselves because the chances of reconciliation between the International Association of Machinists, herein called the IAlM, and the American Federation of Labor herein called the AFL, would be lessened and undesirable repercussions in other plants would result through Board action other than a dismissal;

   (3) the General Labor Relations Agreement of January 7, 1946, herein called the master contract, to which the Employer and several unions, including the Petitioner and the SFU, are parties, and the SFU's supplement thereto constitute a bar to an election; and (4) the Petitioner is estopped from asserting any claim to the employees in issue by reason of the master contract.

   The alleged jurisdictional dispute between the unions in this case had its genesis in (1) the creation by the Employer on December 26, 1944, of the new job classification of operate-set-up man by combining the duties of the operators and the set-up men working on the No. 3 Special Baird Slider Fabricating Presses,' and (2) in the inability of the SFU and the Petitioner, who were then affiliated with the AFL and were recognized representatives of the operators and the set-up men, respectively, to resolve between themselves the question of jurisdiction over this classification. Although the SFU thereafter referred the matter to the AFL for determination, and subsequently received a letter dated December 18, 1945, from President William Green, purporting to award jurisdiction over these employees to it, the Petitioner not only does not recognize the award 2 but has disaffiliated itself from the AFL. In view of such disaffiliation, it is clear that no jurisdictional dispute exists.3 However, the SFU argues further in this connection SHerein called the No. 3 presses.

   2 The Petitioner did not see this letter until the hearing on May 20, 1946.

   3 See Matter of The Cleveland Welding Company, that in the interest of preventing industrial unrest and of not hindering a rapproachment between the AFL and the IAM, the Board should dismiss the petition and leave the parties to adjust the matter between themselves. We do not agree. The Board has frequently proceeded to an election in the face of a dispute between two affiliates where the parent organization could not secure compliance with its orders from the disputants.4 Consequently, where, as here, one of the disputants is clearly not presently affiliated with the parent and there is no indication that its return to the parent is likely within the foreseeable future, the need for an election is made increasingly clear.

   Moreover, the Board, by directing an election, is not seeking to determine the jurisdiction to be enjoyed by either of these unions; it is merely invoking the administrative processes of the Act where in its opinion effective resolution of the existing conflict cannot otherwise be had.

   Nor is there any merit to the SFU's further contention that the master contract and the SFU's supplement thereto bar an election, and that the Petitioner is estopped by the master contract from asserting any claim to the employees in issue.

   The master contract is effective for a period of 2 years from January 8, 1946, and is subject to automatic renewal annually thereafter. It was entered into on January 7, 1946, by the Employer and 14 unions, including the Petitioner and the SFU, and provides for a union shop, with the...