United States Gypsum Co., 889 (1951)
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS â€¢ or AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 15-CA-134. December 29, 1951Order Amending Decision and Order On May 1, 1951, the Board issued its Decision and Order in the above-entitled matter.' Thereafter, on June 15, 1951, Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, making two contentions : First, that the Board's finding of unlawful refusal to bargain must be set aside because, at the time of the refusal, the Union's majority status was based upon an investigation of bargaining representatives conducted while the CIO, with which the Union was and is affiliated, was not in compliance with the filing requirements of the Act. Second, that the Board's entire Decision and Order was invalid because the complaint was based only upon the Union's second amended charge, filed more than 6 months after the occurrence of the unfair labor practices found, or, alternatively, because the original and first amended charges, though filed within the 6-month period, were filed at a time when the CIO was not in compliance. The Board has duly considered the motion. We find merit in Respondent's first contention. The Union's claim to recognition as bargaining r6presentative at Respondent's plant was based upon an election held and a certification issued in a representation proceeding initiated by the Union and conducted by the Board while the CIO was not in compliance. Although this election and certification, which were invalid under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Manufacturing Company,' have been restored to validity by legislative amendment,' Respondent may not now be held liable for its past failure to 'honor' them 4 We hold that Respondent's refusal to bargain in this case constituted a failure to honor the election and certification; we have no alternative but to dismiss the complaint's allegation of an unlawful refusal to bargain.5 Respondent's other contentions, by which it would justify dismissing the entire complaint, are rejected. The Board's complaint in this case was the culmination of an investigation set in motion by the Union's original charge. The complaint could properly have issued 2 94 NLRB 112. z 341 U. S 322 ; see also N. L. R. B. v. Clark Shoe Company, 189 F. 2d 731 (C. A. 1). ' Taft-Humphrey Act, Public Law 189, Chap. 534 (82d Cong., 1st Sess. ), par. (a). 4 Ibid. 5 The Advertiser Company, Inc., 97 NLRB 604; Union Bus Terminal of Dallas, Me, 97 NLRB 206. 97 NLRB...
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